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LAND-VALUE TAXATION AS A METHOD OF
ENCOURAGING GROWTH IN BALTIMORE
Michael Safko
I. Introduction
The events that occurred last May have left many residents of Baltimore wondering what can be done to rebuild their city better than it
was before.1 One particular suggestion is the elimination of all current property taxes along with the implementation of a land-value tax
(LVT).2 An LVT would tax property owners based on the unimproved land they own, rather than on the improvements and structures that have been built on the land.3 The argument follows that
this method of taxation would incentivize property owners to develop
their land, rather than leave it undeveloped so they can pay less in
taxes.4 Indeed, several journalists have postulated this same theory
over the course of the last century.5
Baltimore’s house-flipping market is one of the most lucrative in
America.6 In the second quarter of 2014, flippers in Baltimore were
making an average return on investment (ROI) of 73 percent.7 Baltimore was the third best market for house-flipping in the entire country, behind only New Orleans with an average ROI of 76 percent and
Pittsburgh with an average ROI of 106 percent.8 The LVT is considered essential to drawing more investors into Baltimore’s real estate
1. Dan Reed, Can a Land Value Tax Save Baltimore?, BALT. SUN (June 1, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-land-value-tax20150601-story.html.
2. Id.
3. Merryn Somerset Webb, Land Value Tax – the Best of All Possible Taxes,
MONEYWEEK (Oct. 10, 2013), http://moneyweek.com/land-value-tax-bestpossible-taxes.
4. Reed, supra note 1.
5. See Municipal Real Estate Taxation as an Instrument for Community Planning, 57
YALE L.J. 219, 220 (1947) [hereinafter Real Estate Taxation] (“[The common
American system of property taxation] has produced results which are in
basic conflict with the efficiently planned use of land.”); see also Harold S.
Buttenheim, Unwise Taxation as a Burden on Housing, 48 YALE L.J. 240, 255
(1938) (“The less we tax improvements . . . the greater is the inducement to
erect new homes or improve old ones.”).
6. Reed, supra note 1.
7. Jeff Clabaugh, House Flipping in Baltimore Pays Off, WASH. BUS. J. (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/breaking_ground/2014/
09/house-flipping-in-baltimore-pays-off.html.
8. Id.
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market and curbing inflation of property values when many Americans are still struggling to afford housing.9
II. Background
A. LVT: History and Description
The most primitive stages of the LVT emerged in seventeenth century with the concept that “produit net”10 should sustain the state exclusively via the “impot unique”.11 This concept is different from the
modern LVT in two ways: (1) the value taxed was on the resources
yielded by the land, not the land itself,12 and (2) the tax was to be on
the full net value of the yield.13 This introduced the principle that
taxes should be levied on the “unearned” benefits from the land,
rather than the changes made by the property owner.14 “Produit net”
eventually led to the conception of “economic rent” theory by David
Ricardo.15 Economic rent is the idea that the benefit of valuable property to property owners can be considered a kind of taxable income.16
For example, a vendor in a prime marketplace will be more profitable
than a vendor in the middle of nowhere, simply because the former
has a more valuable property.17
The concept of economic rent spurred a social reform project
called the “single tax,” by a man named Henry George.18 The single
tax was to be levied as a method to tax the value of the economic rent
generated by the land.19 While very similar to an LVT, the single tax
was proposed to be a method of appropriating the entire value of the
land, minus the improvements, while an LVT would likely be lowered
to tax only a fraction of the land’s value.20 The likely reason for this
difference is that George believed, as the name suggests, that the sin9. Reed, supra note 1.
10. OXFORD DICTIONARIES, available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/def
inition/english/produit-net (“In the politico-economical doctrine of the
physiocrats: the amount by which the value of agricultural products exceeds
the cost of their production; the net product.”).
11. Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 230.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Webb, supra note 3.
15. Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 230-31 (“Recognizing that the value of
land tended in “the natural course of things” constantly to increase, he
urged that the future increment of all land be taxed heavily to return to the
community the values which it created independent of any individual initiative or outlay.”).
16. Economic Rent, HENRY GEORGE FOUNDATION, http://www.henrygeorgefoun
dation.org/the-science-of-economics/economic-rent.html?jjj=14443155214
93 (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
17. See id. (using an in-depth example with computer salesmen).
18. Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 231.
19. See id.
20. Samuel B. Clarke, Criticisms upon Henry George, Reviewed from the Standpoint of
Justice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 265, 265 (1888).
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gle tax should be the only tax.21 The modern interpretation of the
LVT does not require the abolishment of all other taxes.22
B. Baltimore’s Current Property Tax
In 2013, Baltimore City’s property tax rate was by far the highest in
the state.23 That is why Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake implemented
the “Change to Grow” plan that same year.24 The goal of this plan is
to greatly increase the population of the city within the next decade.25
Among other methods, one way this goal was to be achieved was by
reducing the heavy burden that is the city’s property tax.26
Within ten years, Mayor Rawlings-Blake had hoped to decrease the
overall property tax rate by twenty cents per one hundred dollars of
assessed property value.27 For the fiscal year of 2015-16, two years after the implementation of “Change to Grow,” the City has lowered
property taxes for homeowners by fourteen cents, but non-residential
real property has not seen any change in its tax rate.28 The slight
decrease in tax rates had little effect on Baltimore’s ability to compete
with surrounding counties.29 Mayor Rawlings-Blake submitted another idea to incentivize the improvement of property by granting tax
credits to developers and homeowners for up to 50 percent of the
taxable value of the property.30 This tax break would decrease gradually for five years until it is gone.31 The plan was approved by the
Baltimore City Council in June of 2014.32
21. Id.
22. See Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 232-40 (using examples of 20th century incarnations of the LVT that retain some sort of minimized property
tax).
23. Yvonne Wenger, City Passes Latest Property Tax Break, BALT. SUN (Jun. 4,
2014), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bsmd-ci-city-taxes-20140604-story.html (Prior to July 2013, the property tax
rate for home owners was at $2.25 per $100 of assessed value in Baltimore
City, while, currently, Baltimore County pays $1.10 per $100, Harford
County pays $1.04, Howard County pays $1.01, and Anne Arundel County
pays $0.95 per $100 of assessed value).
24. Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, A Ten-Year Financial Plan for Baltimore, CHANGE
TO GROW (Feb. 2013), http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/portals/0/agen
cies/finance/changetogrow.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Wenger, supra note 23.
29. Id.
30. Yvonne Wenger, City Council Approvals Tax Breaks to Spur Baltimore Development, BALT. SUN (June 23, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-06
-23/news/bs-md-ci-tax-credits-development-20140623_1_tax-bills-tax-breaks
-property-tax.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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III. Analysis
A. Precedent of the LVT and Other Jurisdictions
In order to make an informed decision on whether an LVT would
be beneficial for Baltimore, it would be prudent to look at other jurisdictions which have adopted the system, or did in the past, and examine the effects. To determine the success of these previous
implementations, the effect of the LVT on the areas’ populations and
property values will be examined.33 Two specific instances shall be
observed: the first in Pennsylvania34 and the second in Japan.35
i. The Pennsylvania Experiment
In 1913, Pennsylvania passed an experimental law on its “secondclass cities”36 that required them to assess a lower tax rate on buildings
than the rate that was assessed on land.37 By 1925, the tax on buildings was to be one-half of tax on land.38 The result of the experiment
showed that building and improvement may have been stimulated as a
result of the lower building tax, with an average of 89.4 percent more
permits issued per capita in effected cities than neighboring cities.39
The new tax resulted in a disincentive to own unused tracts of land, so
they would be sold at a low price to those who would improve it.40
Of the two cities targeted by the tax, Scranton and Pittsburgh,41 it is
difficult to tell whether the population of either was significantly affected by the change. Both cities’ populations were steadily increasing
from a time before the LVT was implemented and did not appear to
33. Some proponents of the LVT believe it would incentivize property owners
to improve their land, see Reed, supra note 1, while others such as the mayor
do not mention the LVT, but want to incentivize more people to live in the
city, see Rawlings-Blake, supra note 24.
34. Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 232 (citing PA. LAWS 1913, No. 147 p.
209).
35. Neal W. Zimmerman, Japan Adopts Land-Value Tax to Curtail Spiraling Prices,
2 J. INT’L. TAX’N 167, 167 (1991).
36. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (“Those containing a population of eighty
thousand and under two hundred and fifty thousand and which by ordinance elect to be a city of the second class A shall constitute the second
class A.”).
37. Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 232 (citing PA. LAWS 1913, No. 147 p.
209).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 233 (“The number of permits which were issued per capita during the
transitional period show a margin of 25 per cent over New York, 52 per
cent over St. Louis, 66 per cent over Philadelphia and Cleveland and 238
per cent over Baltimore.”).
40. Id.
41. Scranton, Pennsylvania Population History, LARGEST US CITIES BY POPULATION,
http://www.biggestuscities.com/city/scranton-pennsylvania (last visited
Sept. 24, 2015); Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Population History, LARGEST US CITIES BY POPULATION, http://www.biggestuscities.com/city/pittsburgh-penn
sylvania (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
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change afterward.42 Scranton reached its highest population of all
time in 1930,43 so if it was benefitted, the effect did not last for very
long.44
ii. The Japanese Take a Different Approach
Japan instituted an LVT itself much more recently, in 1992.45 The
purpose of the LVT in this case, however, was to stabilize the rapidly
increasing value of property.46 In the twenty five years before the LVT
had been implemented, property values in Japan’s largest cities had
raised nearly twenty-fold.47
Japan’s LVT differs slightly from the traditional model in the sense
that the tax would apply to the value of the land assigned for inheritance taxes.48 These values averaged around 70 percent of the official
values of properties of 1990, meaning that landowners would not pay
as much for the LVT as they would for other property taxes.49 Exemptions from the tax are provided to properties that are below a certain
value or are used for public-interest.50
By 2013, the property values in Japan’s largest cities had fallen back
down to the prices they were in 1983.51 The effect of this on the urban population is apparent, as there was only a 5 percent increase in
the urban population from 1970 to 1990, but a 17 percent increase
after the LVT was implemented from 1990 to the present day.52 In
this instance, because the stabilization of the housing market occurred around the same time as the implementation of the LVT,53
42. Supra note 41.
43. Scranton, Pennsylvania Population History, supra note 41.
44. See Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 232 (stating that the Pennsylvania
law came into full effect in 1925).
45. Zimmerman, supra note 35.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 168 (“The following land is exempt from land-value taxation: Land
owned or used by the government and designated public-interest corporations, or used for public welfare, such as for hospitals or social welfare facilities[, r]esidential land, but limited to 1,000 square meters per
unit[, c]ompany-owned housing provided to employees (but not directors)[, l]and where the value is 30,000 yen ($214) per square meter or
less.”).
51. Looking into the Japanese Real Estate Mirror: Residential Home Prices in Japan
Back to Levels Last Seen 30 Years Ago in Spite of Near Zero Percent Mortgage Rates,
DR. HOUS. BUBBLE (Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.doctorhousingbubble.com/
japan-real-estate-bubble-home-prices-back-30-years-zero-percent-mortgagerates/ [hereinafter Japanese Real Estate].
52. Population of Japan, WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/worldpopulation/japan-population/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
53. Japanese Real Estate, supra note 51.
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and the population of cities increased significantly as well,54 the LVT
appears to have been very beneficial for Japan.
B. Would an LVT Have the Desired Effect on Baltimore?
Most would agree that Baltimore’s property tax policy needs to be
“fixed,”55 but there is disagreement about how and for what purpose.56 Mayor Rawlings-Blake has already begun to take the action
she considers necessary to solve the problem.57 Only two questions
are left to determine whether or not Baltimore should attempt to implement an LVT: (1) does further action need to be taken in addition
to the mayor’s current tax plan, and (2) will an LVT effectively fulfill
the goals of all the interested parties?
i. The Necessity of Change
One could argue that there is no need to fix what is not necessarily
broken, especially with a system that has had varying degrees of success in the past.58 Baltimore’s house-flipping market was one of the
most profitable in 2014,59 and continued to become even more profitable through at least the first two quarters of 2015.60 Considering
these facts, it might not be completely unreasonable to let the current
tax system be.
Mayor Rawlings-Blake disagrees with the notion that Baltimore is on
the right path.61 Among other reasons, she believes that a failure to
make any change will result in taxes for property owners remaining
uncompetitive with neighboring counties and a widening budget gap
that will require future budget cuts.62
ii. The Possible Effects of an LVT
The most prolific argument for instituting an LVT is that, since it
would be a penalty on unimproved land, it would incentivize owners
of unimproved land to develop their property.63 This argument, how54. Population of Japan, supra note 52.
55. Reed, supra note 1; Rawlings-Blake, supra note 24, at 20.
56. See Reed, supra note 1 (arguing that an LVT would be best used for encouraging land development and attracting investors); see also Rawlings-Blake,
supra note 24 (aspiring to bring in 10,000 new families to Baltimore within
the next ten years).
57. Rawlings-Blake, supra note 24.
58. See Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 232; see also Japanese Real Estate, supra
note 51.
59. See Clabaugh, supra note 7.
60. See Reed, supra note 1 (claiming that Baltimore has the most profitable market as flippers saw an average ROI of 94% on an investment of $125,313).
61. Rawlings-Blake, supra note 24, at 20.
62. Id.
63. J. Anthony Coughlin, Land Value Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 261, 264 (1999).
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ever, fails to account for the fact that an LVT would apply the same
“penalty” to a landowner with fully developed property.64
A property owner who did not previously have any intention of improving or developing his land would probably not be further incentivized by a higher LVT,65 but this type of property owner may be less
incentivized to own property in the first place.66 The LVT in Pennsylvania exemplifies this.67 Proponents of the LVT would take that
further and abolish the current system of property taxation completely.68 If the majority of property in Baltimore was owned by those
who wanted to develop, and there was no property tax to penalize
them for doing so, then it becomes more apparent why an LVT may
be helpful to Baltimore. That being said, implementing an LVT in a
manner similar to Pennsylvania’s would only affect the development
in the city and is unlikely to have any significant impact on the city’s
population.69
The Japanese implemented an LVT for the explicit purpose of reducing the value of land,70 and it ended up working fairly well for that
purpose.71 However, Japan’s LVT also had a significant effect on the
population growth in the cities.72
Currently, statistics show that 48 percent of housing transactions in
Baltimore are being made in cash, which is indicative of a market
driven by investors.73 It is possible that the investors are attracted to
Baltimore because of the rapidly increasing property values.74 If the
LVT is implemented similarly to Japan’s, it could drive away many of
the investors and house-flippers who are solely concerned with profit
margins.
There are those who believe that an LVT could not raise the sufficient funds necessary for modern local governments.75 The argument
follows that the LVT would need to be higher than current tax rates in
order to remain profitable for the government.76 The benefit of the
LVT is that it can be higher than the current rate of property taxes,77
as long as it does not increase with the value of the structure built on
64. Id. at 264-65.
65. Id. at 265.
66. See Reed, supra note 1 (“An LVT would financially incentivize owners of the
vacant property to make a decision. Develop or ditch the property.”).
67. See Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 233 (explaining that owners of unused tracts of land would sell off their property at lower prices).
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
70. Zimmerman, supra note 35.
71. Japanese Real Estate, supra note 51.
72. See supra note 47 and 52 and accompanying text.
73. Reed, supra note 1.
74. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
75. Coughlin, supra note 63, at 265.
76. Id.
77. Clarke, supra note 20, at 265.
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top of the land.78 This way, landowners who intended to develop the
land would not have to worry about any further tax penalty, and owners who were not using their property would likely sell it to developers.79 Those who develop their land will be able to profit off of the
improvements to their land, rather than the economic rent generated
by it.80
IV. Conclusion
The potential benefits of the LVT cannot be ignored.81 History
shows that, at the very least, an LVT will help prevent housing bubbles
caused by the constantly increasing values of land.82 Stabilizing the
property values also has a clear correlation with the population of the
area.83 Since the mayor has already conceded the necessity for a
change,84 paired with a desire to attract more residents to the city,85
the LVT may just be the logical next step.

78. See Reed, supra note 1 (“[The LVT] eliminates the idea of ‘punishing’ owners from developing a property”).
79. See Real Estate Taxation, supra note 5, at 240 (arguing that the benefit to
developing landowners would likely come at the expense of idle
landowners).
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 46 and 51 and accompanying text.
83. See Population of Japan, supra note 52.
84. Rawlings-Blake, supra note 24, at 20.
85. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.

